Altavian Awarded US Army TUAS Contract
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Knowing the correct time is something we take for granted. But, who exactly decides the correct time in the first place? How does anyone go about determining the correct time? And, how does GPS fit in to the story?
Ultimately, the International Bureau of Weights and Measures (BIPM, Paris) determines the correct time.
To determine the time, BIPM in Paris relies on contributions from a worldwide collaboration of timing laboratories. Each of these laboratories maintain their own measure of time and compare it with GPS time.
Timing labs employ precise clocks. To measure time precisely, Cesium atomic clocks and Hydrogen masers are among the most popular devices.
Although these clocks are very reliable -- accurate to about 2 nanoseconds per day -- small variations still occur. At BIPM in Paris, they compare the performance of clocks in timing labs from around the world. They use a weighted average of all contributions and calculate Coordinated Universal Time (UTC).
Interestingly, labs with better performing or more stable clocks receive more weight in the UTC calculation.
This means that real-time UTC is only an approximation... albeit a very accurate one. Thus, they determine the more precise calculation in retrospect.
The Circular-T journal, published monthly by BIPM, contains the small corrections. They apply these corrections to UTC for the previous month.
Each timing lab contributing to UTC measures its own version of UTC. For example, UTCBrussels is the Belgian measure of UTC.
So how does BIPM compare the performance of all these different clocks?
It uses GPS receivers. Or, more accurately, GNSS (Global Navigation Satellite System) receivers which - in addition to GPS -- track constellations, such as: GLONASS, Galileo, BeiDou and IRNSS.
The precise measurement of time is at the heart of every GPS receiver.
They determine the distances between satellite and receiver, used to calculate position, by measuring the transit times of the satellite signals to the receiver.
An error of 1 nanosecond in the transit time translates into an error of 30cm in the distance.
The GPS satellite constellation uses its own precise measure of time called: GPS time. Each GPS satellite has its own, on-board set of atomic clocks. Thus, satellites are also very accurate flying clocks.
By tracking a GPS satellite, a receiver can record the time differences between its own receiver clock and the satellite clock, e.g. UTCBrussels - GPS time.
The time differences, along with other information, are in a data format called CGGTTS and sent to BIPM. Using CGGTTS and other data, BIPM compares a clock in Brussels with a clock in New York by subtracting the individual differences with GPS time. As such, this technique is known as "common view".
UTCBrussels - UTCNew York = (UTCBrussels - GPS time) - (UTCNew York - GPS time).
The two GPS time terms above cancel each other out leaving the difference between UTCBrussels and UTCNew York.
In order to compare the atomic clocks used in timing labs around the world, they need to connect to a GPS timing receiver. A GPS timing receiver uses an external atomic clock instead of its own clock; which it does by using two output signals from the atomic clock:
Figure 3 depicts the basic ingredients of a timing laboratory.
However, to reach the nanosecond accuracy required, it takes a great deal of expertise and preparation.
Signal delays in all elements in the setup require accurate calibration. To do this, BIPM maintains a set of pre-calibrated travelling receivers as calibration references.
As well as providing 1/3 of the timing receivers used for the calculation of UTC, Septentrio also provides BIPM with timing receivers for calibration.
Beyond defining and disseminating UTC, GPS timing receivers are staking their place at the forefront of science.
For example, take the case of the T2K experiment. By precisely measuring the transit time of neutrinos between two locations, limits are placed on their mass. Thus, it sheds more light on the nature of these elusive particles.
At the other end of the size spectrum, the Very-Long-Baseline Interferometry (VLBI) technique uses radio telescopes at distant locations. These telescopes are linked together in networks by time-synching their observations using GPS common view. The resulting resolution is far in excess of anything that can be achieved by any single telescope on its own.
GPS technology continues to find new ways to improve our world and advance our knowledge of it.
Threats from jammers have long worried GNSS users. And, now, a new GNSS bogeyman is here...spoofers. Unlike jamming, which attempts to block GNSS signals, spoofers are altogether far more sinister.
By replicating GNSS signals, a spoofer can fool a receiver into thinking that it’s elsewhere in either time or location.
And, given a growing reliance on GNSS technology for positioning and timing, it’s not hard to imagine the potential havoc a spoofing attack might cause.
Traditionally, spoofing is an expensive pursuit. A GPS simulator, with a price tag in the tens of thousands of dollars, is usually enough to put off most would-be spoofers.
But the now affordable price of this technology is changing the landscape.
In 2013, a team of researchers from the University of Texas commandeered a 213‑foot yacht using $3,000 worth of equipment.
The arrival of cheap Software Defined Radios (SDR) and open-source code availability is making spoofing more accessible.
If a smartphone provides positioning, the first inkling of a spoofing attack is the phone reporting an obviously wrong location.
Figure 1 shows an example of an attacker spoofing an iPhone6 into reporting its position at the top of Mount Everest.
It was harder to spoof an Acer Android phone. The Acer uses additional positioning information from WiFi and the cellular network.
During this test, the phone owner’s wife was alerted via Facebook that he had left the country.But, spoofing a trip to North Korea might have a slightly less amusing outcome.
In the case of high-end receivers that use multiple frequencies from several satellite constellations, spoofing is more challenging. Below are signs to look for if there is suspicion of spoofing.
The low power of GPS signals means that they are barely discernible from the thermal noise background.
In order to spoof a receiver, the SDR signals are transmitted with a much higher power making them clearly visible above the background as Figure 2 shows.
Over short time frames, satellite distances measured using the code and carrier phase of the satellite signals should show very little difference - Figure 3 (upper panel).
This behavior is difficult to replicate. So, spoofed signals exhibit a difference that can increases rapidly over a short period of time - Figure 3 (lower panel).
Spoofed satellite navigation data is often missing the GPS constellation almanac and is still only a vague match for the real navigation data.
Spoofing techniques are advancing but at the moment, only the GPS L1 signal is spoofed so a common tactic is to additionally jam the L1 Glonass frequencies and the L2 band. This will manifest as a sudden fallback to a GPS only standalone mode.
As shown, single-frequency, low-end devices and smartphones are relatively easy to spoof. High-end multi-frequency receivers aren't so easy. These high-end receivers offer a number of tricks to detect spoofing.
However, in the event such a receiver detects spoofing, what exactly can it do?
High-end receivers have the option of employing spoofing flags. As such, the receiver can alert the user if it detects a spoofing attack directly in the RF spectrum or in the GPS measurements.
If the receiver detects spoofing on one frequency, it can switch to using measurements from other frequencies. Thereby, effectively ignoring the spoofed frequency.
Figure 4 shows this technique in action.
Three receivers are subject to GPS L1 spoofing. As the spoofer power increases, the Septentrio AsteRx4 receiver detects the spoof on L1. At this point, it switches from an L1/L2 to an L2/L5 PVT and successfully maintains an accurate position.
The other multi-frequency receiver also detects a problem. However, it has no alternative dual-frequency solution so simply stops outputting a PVT.
The L1-only module, with no detection mechanisms, switches to tracking the spoofed signal and its position gets spoofed.
An IMU device, either coupled to the receiver or mounted on the board itself, provides a unambiguous check for spoofing. In the presence of spoofing, IMUs can also provide input for an integrated PVT solution to mitigate the effects of spoofing.
High-end GNSS receivers, particularly those employing spoofing detection and mitigation methods are still relatively safe from spoofers.
However, the increasing sophistication of both hardware -- in the form of SDRs and open-source software -- means there’s no room for complacency.